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This paper examines the role of institutions in economic growth and the role of the institutions cre-
ated by the Russian state in particular. The author stresses the finding that growth-supporting insti-
tutions vary according to the level of economic development in a country. In a post-industrial soci-
ety, that Russia aspires to be, further economic development requires promotion of institutions se-
curing e.g. property rights and economic freedom. Finally, based on these observations, the three 
development scenarios frequently discussed in the current Russian economic policy debates are ana-
lysed. 
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Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan instituutioiden, erityisesti Venäjän federaation instituutioiden,  roolia 
talouskehityksessä. Kasvua tukevat instituutiot ovat erilaisia riippuen talouden yleisestä kehitysvai-
heesta. Jälkiteollisessa yhteiskunnassa, jollainen Venäjäkin haluaa olla, talouden kehitys vaatii mm. 
omistusoikeuksien ja taloudellisen toiminnan vapautta tukevia instituutioita. Näiden tulosten pohjal-
ta tutkimuksessa analysoidaan myös Venäjän talouspoliittisessa keskustelussa usein esille nostettuja 
kolmea skenaarioita talouden kehityksestä vuoteen 2020.  
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1  Introduction 
 
Factors influencing state involvement in socio-economic functions  
The role of the state lies at the centre of any discussion on scenarios for socio-economic develop-
ment in Russia. Formulation of the issue is inherently infused not only with traditional Russian (and 
Soviet) ideas about the significance of the state in the setting of economic policy but also, impor-
tantly and relevantly, the fact that state actions are critical in resolving challenges such as pursuing 
a catch-up development strategy. Although well intended, much of our contemporary discussion on 
the role of the Russian state offers only non-specific conclusions (despite some brilliant insights) 
that contribute little in the way of practical solutions to real problems. 
The state naturally plays an important role in the functioning and development of a modern 
economy − especially in the case of economies in transition. This is the accepted view permeating 
the contemporary debate on public policy and the economy from dirigistes on the left to liberals on 
the right. The main issue facing the policy-maker, however, is how such a position should be ex-
pressed concretely, i.e. which socio-economic functions should the state appropriately be involved 
in at the moment. Finding the answer requires a serious and thorough analysis; one where discus-
sion of the state “in general” has no place. 
Two factors directly confer (and largely define) the state role in creation the social, politi-
cal and other conditions for national socio-economic development, and, more specific to this dis-
cussion, conditions that encourage entrepreneurial activity. The first is the stage of technological 
and economic development the country has achieved, i.e. the nature of the existing means of pro-
duction. The second (as a matter of principle) is the maturity of the state in socio-political policy-
making, i.e. the condition and efficiency of the state and its policy-implementing institutions. 
There is no doubt the demands on state participation are different for an agrarian economy, 
an economy based on manufacturing, one dependent on heavy coal and steel industries or a post-
industrial economy. In each case, the possibilities for participation are different and state interven-
tion in the economy requires a specific set of policy tools. This goes beyond the extent of state in-
volvement (i.e. the share of state involvement in GDP) to the specific mechanisms of state regula-
tion of the economy. 
Research over the past 15 years has revealed long-term trends in the evolution of state in-
volvement in the economy.
2 Analysis of this evolution provides four observations. First, present-Vladimir Mau                                                                           The role of state and creation of  
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day economic growth has been predicated on a gradual increase in the role of the state in the econ-
omy. Second, the size of our budget debt relative to per capita GDP has risen, i.e. rising indebted-
ness reflects new forms of participation by the state in economic life that correspond to newly at-
tained levels of economic development. Third, the intensity of the growth of state participation in 
the economy varies at different stages of socio-economic development. Fourth, the expansion of the 
state’s presence in the economy has a natural limit and eventually reaches a saturation point. 
Even if we accept these four observations at face value, it still does not tell us what specific 
forms and levels of state participation in the economy are appropriate for Russia to sustain the 
needed rates of economic growth, implement structural reforms and solve its social problems. 
Thus, it is essential to analyse in concrete terms the specific state actions contemplated to 
move Russia from a transition economy to an industrial economy and eventually to a post-industrial 
economy − especially given that this transition is occurring against the background of a systemic 
transformation of a socialist society. This raises a second important issue: How do we evaluate the 
status and condition of institutions of the state and their capacity to respond effectively and ade-
quately to the challenges of the age? The state possesses its own inherent operating logic; it does 
not simply react or seek to influence national economic development. This logic has had a distinct 
character during the transition period from socialism to capitalism. Needed reorganisation of the 
state has been halting, and from time to time the state has found itself in crisis. This logic not only 
hampers how the state interprets and resolves real problems in socio-economic life, but in some 
cases can deflect the trajectory of development in a wrong direction. 
In considering the period of post-communist transformation of Russian society, it is im-
perative to look at three situations that, in a real sense, influence the challenges and possibilities as 
to how state power is exercised generally and its impact on national economic development in par-
ticular. First, there is the revolutionary nature of the transformation of state power and the social 
system as a whole. This crisis can only be overcome with difficulty due to the sometimes unsuitable 
ways chosen by the state to bring about its own transformation. Second, the state, finding itself in 
the midst of crisis, must resolve simultaneously the problems of restoring economic growth, push-
ing through structural economic reforms, and improving social conditions, while mitigating the so-
cial fallout from a radical upheaval of the social order. Third, we see an increasingly pressing need 
to balance the conflicts from pursuing a catch-up development strategy and attempting to prepare 
Russia to meet the emerging challenges of a post-industrial economy. 
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2  Post-communist Russia and crisis of the state  
 
A feature of Russia’s post-communist reforms has been the struggle to implement systemic reform 
amidst crisis and weakened state power. This fact is typically overlooked or treated as an outcome 
of conscious reform measures in critiques of Russian politics. Some observers have blamed the dif-
ficulties that have arisen on a mistaken decision to take a liberal orientation to post-communist re-
forms, i.e. rapid liberalisation and privatisation are alleged to have caused the crisis of state power. 
This narrative makes little sense from both the theoretical and historical point of view. 
Systemic transformation under conditions  of a weak state  is  essentially a  definition  of 
revolution. Russia (with the possible exception of China) is the only country  where the communist 
system was the product of its own development, and not imposed from the outside. Accordingly, 
Russia’s exit from communism has been complicated; it was accompanied with a collapse of the 
national  consensus  and  an  acute  exacerbation  of  the  struggle  among  social  forces  and  interest 
groups. In contrast, countries of Central and Eastern Europe were unified in efforts to move beyond 
their communist pasts and join the EU. For Russia, the end of communism and the collapse of the 
Soviet empire brought with it social disintegration.
3  
This “revolutionary” transformation has several distinctive features, including some special 
aspects of economic policy and the dynamics of economic processes.
4 Economic policy in a society 
torn by social conflict cannot be stable or consistent. This is particularly reflected in the character 
and possibilities of state influence over the creation of socio-economic processes. Such revolution 
does not, generally speaking, take the form of mass demonstrations, but rather as implemen-
tation of systemic transformations under conditions of a weak state. Researchers ignore at their 
peril the fact that weakness of the state has been an overarching factor in the development of the 
Russian economy since the late 1980s. 
State weakness has been manifested in the shifts in economic direction and a plurality of 
competing centres of power, as well as the absence of fully developed, reliably functioning political 
institutions and intelligible, permanent “rules of the game.”  State weakness is accompanied by a 
cluster of special issues related to functioning of the economy. 
Here are a few of the economic consequences of the weakness of state power, borne out by 
experience; not just in present-day Russia, but in all major revolutions:
5 
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  Inadequate efforts at shaping and developing a market economy. This leads to dis-
tortions in an emerging market, which, in turn, allows some of the darker sides of busi-
ness to thrive. The state has no opportunity to regulate business in ways that protect the 
interests of society. 
  Limited means of collecting taxes. The sharp growth in the inflation tax and, more fre-
quently, the drastic exacerbation of budget crises, leads to under-financing of a signifi-
cant share of the state’s liabilities. (We emphasise here that this has been characteristic 
of practically all countries that have found themselves in a similar situation). 
  A sharp rise in transaction expenses. This leads to reduced competitiveness of domes-
tic production. 
  Demonetisation of the national economy. This shrinks the official GDP figure. The 
phenomenon has also been observed in countries that have managed to escape inflation-
ary processes. Demonetisation is often accompanied with cash hoarding. 
  Resolving socio-political (stabilisation of power) and fiscal problems take prece-
dence over economic development challenges. Here, the weak state is worried about 
the optics of privatisation measures rather than actual outcomes.
6 
 
Finally, weak states are vulnerable to corruption and lobbying. This makes it impossible for the 
state to be strengthened through “point blank” measures to expand direct state involvement in the 
economy, and leads to a paradoxical inference familiar in our discourse. The syllogism goes like 
this: It is necessary to expand the regulatory role of the state, because the Russian state is weak and 
corrupt. Therefore, we need to expand the function of the corrupt state! Obviously, it is necessary to 
strengthen a weak state, but such a task cannot lead to an expansion of the opportunities for bu-
reaucracy to interfere in the economic life of the country, and in particular engage in its favourite 
activity, discretionary allocation (and “in the interests of the state”) of scarce resources. 
The most important feature in the creation of a political process (especially in drafting and 
implementation of economic policy) for a weak state is that the core of the process is not occupied 
by the organisation of a necessary political majority through existing institutions (parliament, 
parties), which are weak, and occasionally even malformed and unstable, but by a direct interac-
tion between the representatives of power (the government) and leading groups of economic 
interests. These groups manipulate the real levers of political power. In the early stages of trans-
formation,  these  economic  groups  may  even  perform  the  function  of  political  parties.
7  Andrei  
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Shleifer and Daniel Tresiman are absolutely correct, therefore, when they write that “the reformers 
knew that the achievements of marketisation will only be preserved in the event that they are able to 
create a powerful political coalition to support the creation of free markets”
8 so that the situation 
may continue to fundamentally evolve. At some point, however, the state has to get on with forma-
tion of a party system and begin to exclude economic groups from political decision-making. There 
is more than a bit of irony here. On the upside, this process restricts the ability of big business to 
use the state for unbridled satisfaction of narrow self-interest. On the downside, the process may 
lead to unnecessary confrontations between the authorities and business and failure of the state to 
act as it should in fostering optimum conditions for entrepreneurial activity. 
To sum up, all the factors listed above in their entirety would be found in any major revo-
lution. An analysis of the contemporary Russian transformation through this prism helps in creating 
a narrative for the seemingly strange course of events in Russia over the last twenty-five years. 
A caveat is appropriate at this juncture. The challenges and confusion over weak power 
(particularly during the initial stages of post-communist development) and the inability of the state 
to implement its own decisions relates to the very process of erecting a democratic regime based as 
much on precedent and experience as law. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, many Western 
analysts had growth comfortable with the notion of the USSR as stable regime in which the authori-
ties imposed state decisions on society.
9 The transition from Soviet totalitarianism to democracy 
imposed by non-state actors was seen as a weakening of the system and legal process, yet no refer-
ence was made to the revolutionary nature of the transformation. This is particularly important in a 
country with a federal system, in which, apart from the other problems of creating a democratic sys-
tem, it is necessary to look for suitable forms of interaction between the institutions of the federal 
authorities and the authorities in charge of sub-divisions federal power (i.e. regional and local au-
thorities). We know similar problems earlier confronted countries in the West, especially the US. 
As Triesman notes: “To anyone engaged in the question of why it is so difficult for the central gov-
ernment to root out corruption in the Russian Federation, the question may also be put as to why it 
was so difficult to overcome slavery and then segregation in the federal United States.”
10 
With the introduction of basic post-communist reforms, it became possible to strengthen 
the power of the state. The government moved ahead with macro-economic stabilisation (budgetary 
and monetary) and there was a renewal of economic growth nationally. This fact, along with politi-
cal stabilisation, created the prerequisites for a large expansion of opportunities for the power of the 
state in regulating socio-economic processes. Vladimir Mau                                                                           The role of state and creation of  
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Admittedly, the extent of political consolidation should not be overstated. After a period of 
lengthy and profound crisis, time is still needed to re-establish the effectiveness of the functioning 
of state power – in a manner adequate in light of the situation and the needs of social development, 
as well as the specific problems associated with the development of the economy (including stimu-
lating the entrepreneurial climate). Success here depends greatly on suppressing political tendencies 
that might act as a brake on the process. 
 
 
3  The state and catch-up development in a post-industrial era 
 
The historical goal of our post-socialist transformation lies, in the final analysis, in the evolution 
from a contemporary industrial system to a post-industrial economy that gradually narrows the gap 
between itself and the most advanced economies. The first aspect of this strategic problem − mak-
ing the technological shift − is qualitative . The second − increasing the scale of production through 
structural reform – is quantitative. These challenges are interconnected with the post-industrial era 
determining to some extent the character of policies needed to implement a catch-up development 
strategy. These challenges will basically been achieve in the day-to-day operations of companies , 
but it is also critical for the state to provide adequate and appropriate support. Ultimately, the state 
must create many of the necessary conditions for innovative business activity. 
Traditionally, catch-up development policies assume the catch-up state performs specific 
functions to close the gulf with its advanced counterparts. The question of the role of the state has 
always provoked keen discussion, which invariably goes beyond the bounds of theoretical polemics 
to the political struggle observable in any society conscious of its backwardness and unwilling to 
resign itself to such a situation. The basic methodological principles of research into this problem 
are contained in Alexander Gerschenkron’s work in the 1960s, although his arguments must natu-
rally be modified for the modern context. 
Gerschenkron distinguishes areas of state activity in pursuit of a catch-up strategy. These 
are basic structural reforms to promote higher economic growth, actions that directly guarantee op-
portunities for growth, and conversion of potential growth into actual growth. In his analysis, the 
role of the state lies first and foremost in the creation of a favourable environment and elimination 
of institutional obstacles to economic growth (e.g. assuring political stability ). The specific set of 
measures selected by the state depend on the circumstances surrounding the historical development  
BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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and the presence or absence of factors  that sustain productive capabilities at their current  level. 
There is often a related issue of overcoming negative factors created earlier by the state in its eco-
nomic development.
11 Special measures, of course, are needed to boost economic growth to levels 
high enough to sustain the catch-up strategy. These are no less varied and appear in the form of cer-
tain institutions that serve to ensure economic growth. In the industrial era, some of the institutions 
that promoted growth include investment banks (as in Germany) or direct state participation in eco-
nomic life (as in Russia in the late 19
th and early 20
th  century). 
In principle, differentiation of these factors should be important in understanding how the 
state performs its role in different economic policy circumstances. It is ultimately the function of the 
state to provide the fundamentals for growth, and in so doing remove obstacles to economic pro-
gress at each stage of scientific and technical development. State-adopted measures are similar for 
countries embarking on economic growth and pursuing catch-up development (recall that what we 
are talking about here is a comparison of measures applicable at the particular stage of social devel-
opment and scientific and technical progress). Yet measures to foster growth are often different for 
different countries, even when the decisions taken pertain to similar sets of problems. The state did 
not play a significant role in promoting economic growth in countries first to industrialise, and its 
role was quite limited in the catch-up industrialisation of both Germany and Japan. In contrast, the 
state played a significant role in Russia the first half of the 20
th century, and later in the emerging 
industrial economies of Asia. 
What, then, is the connection with the significant and positive role of the state in the reso-
lution of problems associated with catch-up development?  Two answers suggest themselves. Ger-
schenkron, basing his comments exclusively on the experience of industrialisation, explains the 
connection in terms of backwardness; the more backward the country, the more active the direct 
intervention of the state needed in the economic process. It can be inferred from his observation 
that, to the extent backwardness is overcome, the importance of the state as an institution for reduc-
ing uncertainty in the process of accumulating capital is correspondingly weakened as its role is 
gradually ceded to the banks (as was the case in the catch-up development of relatively more ad-
vanced Germany).
12 The second suggested explanation of how much state involvement is appropri-
ate draws on experiences from the last decades of the 20
th century. Here, the role of the state is seen 
as largely emerging from the stage of socio-economic development; i.e. the state’s role is funda-
mentally different in an industrial and a post-industrial world. We examine this second assertion in 
detail. Vladimir Mau                                                                           The role of state and creation of  
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How much the state can contribute positively to development in an industrial and post-
industrial context relates, in the first instance, to the nature of the productive forces at the time. This 
situation dictates how amenable (or perhaps more accurately, how resistant) these forces are to state 
intervention in promoting technological progress.  
In an industrial society, the central question for state policy is how to marshal resources to 
support nascent technical development and mobilise all forces and inputs available to society. In a 
post-industrial society with distinctly more advanced technologies, this approach would not just be 
ineffective,  but  impossible.  Instead  of  marshalling  resources,  the  main  problems  in  post-
industrial society are preserving, as far as possible, the flexibility available to individual eco-
nomic actors, and maintaining a political and legal environment so that all actors are guided 
towards and focused on active development and satisfying their transactional counterparties 
(e.g. in contract performance or service delivery). 
We cite below a selection of requirements for the functioning of the state (or economic 
policy conditions) to enable the resolution of problems associated with a catch-up development in a 
post-industrial society; a list of desirable aspects of state policy in a modern world. 
 
The political regime. The political regime needs to be stable and possess the adaptability to meet 
the problems facing the country. Although the connection between socio-economic and political 
development has received detailed analysis from economists and political scientists,
13 there appears 
to also be a connection between the level of socio-economic development and possibilities for creat-
ing a political regime conducive of catching up with advanced economies. In other words, the kinds 
of problems to be solved are linked somehow to the stage of socio-economic development. Thus, 
the particular political regime best suited to the process of catch-up will necessarily be different in 
an industrialisation and post-industrialisation phase. 
Whereas an industrial growth spurt for a backward (agrarian) country might have been best 
served by an authoritarian regime capable of marshalling forces and resources, moving to the post-
industrial level may demand stable democracy. There is extensive literature showing how and why 
economic growth fosters a general basis for the establishment of a political democracy and civil lib-
erties.
14 However, for a society whose growth is based on the movement of information flows and 
individualised needs, feedback is no less important: modern economic growth requires institutions 
that guarantee freedom (political and intellectual) and protect property.   
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Creating a flexible, adapting society presupposes encouraging creative activity on the part 
of its agents, something scarcely achievable where economic and political initiative are suppressed. 
The freedoms of creativity, information and  individual participation are the most important prereq-
uisites to achieving a post-industrial society. It is necessary for political and economic conditions 
conducive to creation of intellectual property and high-value services. Paraphrasing a cliché of So-
viet times, it might be said that freedom is transmuted into the direct productive force of a soci-
ety. At present (i.e. the present stage of development of productive forces) the link between the ca-
pacity to adapt and liberal democracy would seem to be sufficiently obvious. 
Another political factor is required to safeguard power, and important in any type of catch-
up development, consists in preserving a consensus about the basic principles and developmental 
points of reference between the principal groups and social strata, particularly within the framework 
of a country’s political, economic and intellectual elite. The issue here is the need to create and sup-
port a community of ideas among these elites as to the desirable trends and prospects of national 
development. 
 
Property. The creation of an adequate system of property relations is one of the more fundamental 
problems of power. As applied in post-industrial society, the issue pertains to providing guaran-
tees of rights to private property directly connected with the provision of conditions for the 
self-realisation of the creative individual. This general thesis must find its realisation in a series 
of specific aspects concerning the functioning of property relations. 
A particular conundrum is found in problems involving the protection and enforcement of 
intellectual property rights. There is a widespread view that stringent observance of intellectual 
property rights is a major prerequisite to post-industrial society.  Others, however, argue that rapid 
growth in the post-industrial world demands unimpeded movement of information, and therefore 
repudiation of private intellectual property rights.
15 
While the emerging discussion is still largely speculative, it deserves serious consideration. 
We can assume that the most advanced economies, which deal regularly with frontier technologies 
will seek in the post-industrial era to jealously defend their intellectual property rights (and may 
even play a critical  role in their policy-setting). At the same time, countries pursuing  catch-up 
strategies will demand easy and full access to information (particularly with regards to innovation 
and technology), especially in light of the fact that the lifecycle of products and technologies is has Vladimir Mau                                                                           The role of state and creation of  
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been drastically shortened by the acceleration in scientific and technical progress and global dis-
semination of information. 
 
Economic freedom. Political freedom in a post-industrial world is inseparable from economic free-
dom. The ratio of the budget size relative to GDP may serve as a rough statistical indicator of eco-
nomic freedom.
16 Judging the evidence, it appears the claim of a low budget-to-GDP ratio (on the 
order of 20-25 %) for the attainment of high rates of growth remains a subject of discussion both 
from the point of view of the adequacy of measuring methods and applicability of this indicator in a 
dynamic analysis (i.e. does growth necessarily increase when the size of the budget relative to GDP 
is reduced?).
17 An analysis of the existing, albeit limited, experience of development in the post-
industrial world currently permits only two conclusions. 
First, at the post-industrialisation phase, a country pursuing a successful catch-up strategy 
requires a lower budget burden than might be tolerated by a very advanced economy. In this re-
spect, there is a real difference from a catch-up strategy in the industrialisation phase, where there is 
typically extensive marshalling of resources in the budget. In the post-industrialisation phase, a low 
budget burden recognises high degrees of technological and economic uncertainty that require a 
large proportion of society’s resources remain in the hands of private agents of economic life. 
Second, the budget burden is a problem not just quantitative, it has a structural aspect. As a 
result, it is not merely the scale of state participation that matters, but how state resources are allo-
cated. Hence, an advanced system of education is the most important factor in post-industrialisation, 
and this requires corresponding expenditure on the part of the state. 
In the 1990s, we saw wide dissemination of an argument that might be called “presump-
tion of state non-intervention.” Supporters of this approach, whilst recognising the important role 
of state regulation, draw attention to a series of dangers in restricting economic freedom and ex-
panding the intervention of the state in economic life. These include bureaucracies that seeks to pre-
serve interests far removed from the interests of society at large, the influence of interest groups on 
state decision-making (which is particularly dangerous in the case of a weak state) and the asymme-
try and unreliability of information available to the state.
18 
 
Replicating institutions. Catch-up development presupposes the creation of a new system of institu-
tions. The complexity of this challenge, however, makes it impossible to directly replicate institu-
tions in advanced economies. Certain institutions, of course, are common to all stable developed  
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societies. Most, however, have little to contribute when it comes to bridging gaps in socio-economic 
development. In a number of cases, institutions, effective in an advanced society, may act as a brake 
on development in a more backward context. Similarly, obsolete institutions in the developed con-
text may help foster  growth. Moreover, it is rarely the case that institutions that are designed to 
promote economic growth in one context can readily be repurposed for a different social or cultural 
milieu. Thus, when designing an appropriate catch-up strategy, one is likely to encounter this prob-
lem of relative success in different institutional environments. 
At the general level, one may differentiate between: (1) institutions important for the stable 
functioning of the economy in a contemporary society; (2) institutions typical of a developed soci-
ety that nevertheless are counterproductive for catch-up development; and (3) institutions not found 
in advanced countries, but capable of solving problems in the catch-up development context. This 
differentiation is extremely qualified. At different stages of economic development and in differ-
ent countries, the significance of individual institutions can play quite opposite roles. A strik-
ing example is that of private property and competition, the restriction of which is typical for 
catch-up development as a stage of mature industrialism. In a post-industrial society, guaran-
tees of private property and the stimulation of competition are (or are capable of being) im-
portant contributors to progress.
19 
 
A structured policy. In a post-industrial context, competitiveness can be a significant factor of eco-
nomic life. Instead of direct state involvement in economic life, the state must now, first and 
foremost, provide the opportunity for individual economic agents to make decisions and bear 
the  responsibility  for  the  outcomes  of  their  implementation.  In  other  words,  the  state  must 
minimise the taking of decisions of an individual nature and instead focus on consistent support for 
unified rules of conduct. 
In the early stages of preparation of a strategy for catch-up economic growth, however, in-
dividual decisions may be dangerous. It is still nearly impossible to define the comparative advan-
tages of the country, and it is highly likely that any decisions to support (even give moral support) 
to individual sectors will be harmful to the extent they are a restraint on the national economy. In 
the economic structure created, the most influential and financially independent actors will, as a 
rule, be sectors of the traditional economy that are unlikely to contribute much taking the economy 
to the next level. Yet these are the very actors with the highest potential for lobbying. They can be 
expected to seek to impose their own interests in terms of national priorities. Vladimir Mau                                                                           The role of state and creation of  
a market economy in Russia  
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It is not an issue of today’s most efficient sectors pushing for policies that will ultimately 
be ineffective. Obviously, the simplest solution is to grant them a political income to preserve fa-
vourable conditions for their industries as long as possible. But as long as the state supports them, it 
is preserving existing structures developed and missing out on opportunities to take advantage of 
the adaptive potential of the economy. On the other hand, if the state commits to distancing itself 
from direct supports to individual branches and sectors, it will nudge incumbents to seek new solu-
tions and new effective areas for the application of capital. 
To reiterate, the issue here is rejecting individual decisions that assign priorities for sepa-
rate branches of industry and undertakings. This does not mean a refusal to support an activity 
which meets a general and sufficiently well-defined criterion. A refusal to support individual sectors 
and firms certainly does not deny the expediency of supporting, say, the export of non-raw material 
goods (or engineering products), i.e. support for those who are capable of demonstrating their com-
petitive advantages in an external market, thereby proving their effectiveness on the basis of objec-
tive criteria. The issue here then is the appropriate form and mechanisms of support. Naturally, it 
need not be a question of direct budgetary assistance or other forms of non-market competition. 
The refusal to support industry-related priorities does not mean a refusal to support priori-
ties in the taking of economic policy (including budgetary) decisions in principle. Numerous works 
of research bear witness to the exceptional importance of investing in human capital, especially 
where it comes to education. While education was important during the industrial era, its impor-
tance in the current context cannot be understated. The ability of the state to focus resources on 
development of education and healthcare is one of the most important factors in the accelera-
tion of socio-economic development in the post-industrial age. Moreover, participation by the 
state in this matter plays a very important role, since in relatively backward countries the opportuni-
ties for private investment in education are quite limited. 
 
 
4  Institutional factors in economic growth 
   
A key question in contemporary discussions on economic growth and the role of the state is the 
creation of a modern system of political, economic and social institutions capable of meeting the 
challenges of the post-industrial age. The key role of institution-building is well documented in the 
literature of the past two decades.  
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In analysing institutional problems, the solution of which is necessary t o ensure a stable 
economic development and structural transformation of modern Russia, it is useful to single out cer-
tain groups of institutions and define their logical significance. There are four groups of institutions. 
The first are political and legal institutions associated with guaranteeing civil and political 
rights of the citizenry, especially economic agents. These defend basic rights, the recognition of 
which by the state has, in time, become the basis for modern economic growth. This includes guar-
antees concerning the inviolability of the person and property, the independence of the courts, the 
effectiveness of the legal system and freedom of the mass media. 
Next are institutions that assure the development of human capital. Here we are talking 
about education, healthcare, the pension system and the provision of housing. It would be a mistake 
to attribute the current problems of these sectors solely to under-financing. The key obstacle to their 
development is the lack of institutional reform, i.e. the failure to redefine their purpose for current 
needs. The majority of existing models for the functioning of the social sphere were developed dur-
ing the period of transformation from an agrarian to an industrial economy, when different objective 
conditions existed. The demographics were different, as the population had large young cohorts. 
The structures of the population and employment were different. In today’s Russia, and in other de-
veloped countries, the social situation has changed in a real sense. The traditional institutions of so-
cial support (i.e. those established at the late 19th and early 20th  centuries) are proving to be ex-
tremely expensive and ineffective. 
Third, there are strictly economic institutions created through legislation to guarantee the 
stable functioning and development of the national economy. It is the task of contemporary legisla-
tion to guarantee economic growth and the structural modernisation of the economy. 
Fourth, we have special institutions aimed at resolving specific, concrete problems of eco-
nomic growth. It has recently become common to speak of “institutions of development,”  a select 
group for which the rules of the game applied generally to participants in economic or political life 
are suspended. These institutions exercise a discrete influence on the economy unlike strictly eco-
nomic institutions that act on a general basis. 
These four groups of institutions are listed in order of logical importance. This does not 
mean that, for example, economic legislation is not important to the stable functioning of the econ-
omy. It is simply that, without any real guarantees of basic personal rights, any economic legislation 
would just be a dead letter. Vladimir Mau                                                                           The role of state and creation of  
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Ultimately, guarantees of basic rights form the basis and establish the conditions needed 
for stable economic growth (at least, in an economy based on private enterprise). Here, we empha-
sise issues of personal security, protection of property and effective state control, rather than the 
more familiar set of political rights characteristic of modern market democracies. As is shown by 
the experience of the last three centuries, confidence in the security of the individual and the preser-
vation and protection of accumulated wealth helps promote active entrepreneurial activity, irrespec-
tive of whether the entrepreneur has the right to vote or bothers to exercise that right, or whether he 
or she lives under a republican or a monarchical system.  Much more important for the creation of 
guarantees of personal rights are a dependable judicial system and the mechanisms for ensuring the 
implementation of the law. These reduce transaction costs, which translates into increased business 
competitiveness. The existence of independent mass media helps assure public control of the func-
tioning of these institutions. At the same time, the traditional democratic institutions are also neces-
sary for a country to reach a certain level of socio-economic development, particularly in the case of 
countries with a large educated urban population. 
In recent economic policy discussions, a widely aired view states that modernisation of the 
political system is not a top priority. Two lines of argument can be traced here: 
The first emphasises the specific nature of Russian political institutions (and, correspond-
ingly, the institutions of democracy) compared to contemporary developed democracies. At issue 
here the Russia’s special path of development, not the typical development path of Western democ-
racies.  A  distilled  view  is  contained  in  the  “sovereign  democracy”  discussion  of  the  last  two 
years.20 
The second argument recognises a contemporary Western model as a benchmark for de-
velopment of national political institutions. It does not treat such institutions as a necessary condi-
tion for consolidation of economic growth at a given stage in national development, nor is stable 
and visible growth linked with the creation of an effective, modern system of state control. Instead, 
the focus is on available potential for pursuing a catch-up development strategy based on techno-
logical mimicry. Imitation is claimed to initially support high economic growth rates even in condi-
tions of the weak development of institutions. True innovation is only needed at a later stage when 
modernisation of the industrial branches of the economy has taken place and the political institu-
tions needed to permit further national development have been established. 
This is, to say the least, debatable. It is fully applicable in the context of a country complet-
ing the transition from an agrarian economy to an industrial one,  i.e. industrial modernisation. A  
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predominantly agrarian population, as a rule, responds strongly in embracing their improved  mate-
rial well-being without raising demands for modern political institutions. An educated urban popu-
lation, in contrast, is likely to demand certain guarantees, and to this end, is prepared to participate 
in the state decision-making process.  It is for precisely this reason that the modernisation of the 
state is an absolute priority for the resolution of all the other problems of economic and social mod-
ernisation. 
The development of human capital is the second most important factor in modernisation. 
This is a major institutional problem all countries undergoing post-industrial transformation must 
solve. The present crisis in the social arena is not only the result of the crisis of the Soviet system, it 
reflects a crisis of the industrial system. The present model of the social state (a model of the devel-
opment of human potential) was based, in principle, on different demographic and social conditions, 
i.e. high population growth, predominance of younger age groups, a largely rural populace, and lit-
tle involvement with a state-provided system of social support. Ageing populations today expect the 
state to deliver a broad range of social services, so it is necessary to create a radically new model of 
the social state.21 
As a result, the search for an optimum model for the development of human capital should 
look at minimum at real-world experiences − effective systems to meet contemporary challenges do 
not exist. Indeed, the country that creates a modern and effective model for the development of hu-
man capital will benefit from a powerful advantage in the post-industrial world. 
Reforming economic legislation also represents an important trend in institutional mod-
ernisation.  For the last ten years, a good deal has been done in this direction and the country has 
witnessed the creation of a fairly developed body of economic legislation. Its lack of effectiveness 
reflects the lack of development of institutions of political and administrative regulation and the 
weakness of mechanisms for enforcement of the law. 
The following basic trends in the development of economic institutions are presently at the 
fore in Russia: 
 
  The creation of a competitive environment and the overcoming of monopolistic tenden-
cies in the economy. Of particular importance here are the creation of effective and 
transparent in regulation by the state, the setting of distinct criteria and assuring trans-
parency in decisions relating to state participation (and state support) for individual sec-Vladimir Mau                                                                           The role of state and creation of  
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tors of economic and social life, and no tolerance for conflicts-of-interest for civil ser-
vants involved in regulatory decision-making or state procurement activities. 
  Providing incentives and eliminating barriers to entry for new companies seeking to en-
ter the market. This is the most important condition for intensifying the innovation proc-
ess as new undertakings are willing to shoulder risk and, as a rule, more productive. 
Here, it makes sense to create an infrastructure of support for new small and medium-
sized businesses, to make it simpler for small undertakings to lease commercial space, to 
create technology parks and business incubators, to widen the system of micro-credits, 
and incentivise the export of goods with high value-added (including small and medium-
sized firms). 
  The development of a market for land and other real property, for these ultimately form 
the basis for property relations and are an important economic source of guarantees of 
property rights. This is particularly important for new innovation firms as it provides 
collateral that can serve as a basis for access to credit. 
  The development of financial markets as a source of capital for economic growth. This 
will require increased reliability of financial institutions, the creation and development 
of new financial instruments to provide savings alternatives to existing forms of saving 
and a more reliable protections of the rights of financial market participants. 
 
In forming a system of economic institutions, it is sensible to focus on borrowing from EU legisla-
tion.
22 The aquis communautaires, for example, provide a sufficiently successful example of con-
temporary market legislation that is particularly for us as over 50 % of Russian goods exports go to 
Europe. Naturally, not all sections of European legislation are appropriate for stimulating growth, 
but those basic parts dedicated to economic freedoms, anti-monopoly regulation and so forth are 
entirely appropriate for present-day Russia.
23 
However, in moving in this direction it is necessary to take into account an important fact. 
European economic institutions demand European institutions ensure that legislation is imple-
mented, particularly where the judicial system is concerned. One cannot be effective without the 
other. Even of laws regulating the economy can be readily replicated in our law and practice, 
Europe’s legal framework cannot easily be adopted. A significant amount of time will be needed to 
reach the needed level of judicial effectiveness. In this, we encounter a fundamental hurdle for pre-
sent-day Russia.  
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  Finally, a special place is occupied by the institutions of development that have become 
central to the economic policy discussion of the past two years. There is as yet no strict understand-
ing of what is actually meant by this institutional form. In one view, they are organisations involv-
ing a private-state partnership. In the other, they are means of directing state financing to projects 
involving factors that underpin growth. Apparently, the most accurate descriptor here is that they 
manifest expressions of discrete rules of the game, i.e. the exercise of state power in the economic 
sphere affecting a limited part of the economic space and specific economic entities. 
  These institutions of development may be financial (e.g. investment funds) or administra-
tive (e.g. special economic zones). However, this second category is more qualified as non-financial 
institutions rely on budget spending. Financial institutions include the Investment Fund of the Rus-
sian Federation, Vnesheconombank, the Russian Venture Company, the Agency for Mortgage 
Housing Credit, Rosselkhozbank, Rosagroleasing, the Russian Nanotechnology Corporation, the 
Russian Investment Fund for Information and Communication Technologies and the Fund for As-
sistance for the Reform of Municipal Housing Economy. Among non-financial institutions, we 
mention again special economic zones (industrial and production zones, technology and innovation 
zones, tourism and recreational zones, ports and harbours), technology parks, industrial estates, 
business incubators, technology transfer centres and others. 
  The most important task for the institutions of development is to create conditions for real-
ising long-term investment projects. At present, the share of credits issued by Russian banks for pe-
riods exceeding three years does not exceed 15 % of the overall volume of credit. For several rea-
sons, particularly the absence of a credit history affecting practically all the participants in the eco-
nomic life of the country, private investors have decided to avoid the long-term credit risk posed by 
such projects. However, there are serious risks in embarking on a course actively based on institu-
tions of development, i.e. using them as surrogates for private business (and private risk) in the im-
plementation of commercially attractive projects, or to support ostensible makeovers of  loss-
making enterprises or branches of industry that are either politically motivated or provide opportu-
nities for corruption. 
  Time will tell how effective these institutions prove to be. In principle, the reasons for their 
creation are easy enough to understand; there is a political desire to support economic growth, speed 
up diversification of the economy and Russia’s export structure, and to help out new firms lacking 
any credit history. Of no less importance are the country’s enormous financial resources that will 
inevitably become hostage to this political struggle. Vladimir Mau                                                                           The role of state and creation of  
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  However, the fundamental problem with institutions of development is that almost of all of 
them are, in one way or another, rooted in the industrial era, i.e. a time when the state, under a cen-
tralised system, set the priorities of long-term development and marshalled resources to accomplish 
development goals. In highly dynamic and technologically advanced post-industrial conditions, de-
fining long-term priorities becomes extremely challenging and mistakes become extremely costly. 
  There is also the unanswered question as to whether it is possible to design institutions of 
development in a way that they do not contribute to macro-economic destabilisation. 
 
 
5   Models of socio-economic development 
 
Present-day economic policy discussions address, in one form or another, three scenarios for socio-
economic development of Russia: inertia, growing raw materials exports and innovation. The iden-
tification and ranking in logic order of preference of these scenarios is useful in making a model for 
state economic policy. 
   
The inertia scenario. This assumes the continued predominance of the energy and raw materials 
sectors against the background of steadily slowing growth in the extractive industries, with fuel and 
energy exports hampered by lags in infrastructure development. Here, it is unlikely that we will see 
the realisation of large-scale investment projects in industries outside the framework of the fuel and 
energy sectors. Instead, we see increased disparities across social strata and regions, degradation in 
the quality of human capital, a reduction in competitiveness of the manufacturing industry and in-
creased displacement of domestic goods by imports. 
 
Growing raw material exports scenario. This assumes active leveraging of Russia’s competitive 
advantages in the energy sector, the implementation of major infrastructure projects allowing an 
increase in the productive potential of traditional branches of Russian export. Special attention here 
is devoted to development of energy products and transport. Given the special character of these 
sectors, we can assume a strengthening of the state’s role in the organisation and regulation of eco-
nomic life. Under this scenario, the necessity of private-state partnerships becomes especially acute. 
Here, the economy is more exposed to movements in world commodity prices. 
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The innovation scenario. Here, competitive advantages in the spheres of fuel and raw materials are 
used to diversify and qualitatively restructure the Russian economy. Fundamental to this effort is a 
sharp upgrading in the quality of human capital to allow the adoption of hi-tech production ap-
proaches. Economic growth could reach 6−6.5 % per annum. In point of fact, this is a scenario of a 
post-industrial spurt in which Russia is able to find its niche in the division of labour system of con-
temporary globalisation. This scenario assumes a structural manoeuvre that increases the share of 
the innovation sector from the present 10 % of GDP to approximately 20 %, with a corresponding 
drop in the share of the oil and gas sector’s contribution from the current 20 % to about 10 %. 
With some reservations, these scenarios might be described as the Nigerian, Mexican and 
Australian scenarios. Nigeria, a country with abundant fuel and energy resources, has seen stagna-
tion in and degradation of its political and economic institutions – even severe political and eco-
nomic crises. Mexico has enjoyed extensive income from oil that has permitted a significant, albeit 
uneven, economic growth. There has been moderate diversification of the economy and low devel-
opment of human capital. Existing institutions have been unable to take advantages of Mexico’s 
proximity to the North American market. Finally, the Australian experience has been a successful 
one in a country rich in natural resources has leveraged its favourable endowments to diversify its 
economy. The export of natural resources to China, Japan and countries of Southeast Asia have 
provided significant resources that could be applied to diversification of domestic production and 
the creation of a modern post-industrial economy.
24 
The three scenarios mentioned should not be viewed as alternatives. More accurately, they 
reflect stages of effort to be invested in moving the Russian economy to a post-industrial level. For 
events to unfold favourably the inertia scenario must be abandoned and the growing export of raw 
materials scenario embraced. This provides (at least based on the Australian experience) the founda-
tions for instituting the innovative mechanisms of socio-economic development. In other words, the 
first and second scenarios are stages on the road to solving the strategic problems of Russian devel-
opment. However, these versions may also become alternatives if the transition from one stage to 
another is unsuccessful. 
There now arises a key question: How does a country transition from one growth model to 
another?  There are, in principle, two mechanisms: money and institutions. A change in a country’s 
development model may be achieved with the help of state (and state-related) investments in certain 
sectors of the economy and the implementation of thorough institutional reforms to create favour-Vladimir Mau                                                                           The role of state and creation of  
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able conditions  for the  activities of economic agents,  as  well as  stimuli  to  promote the  higher 
growth of industries that support development of human capital. 
It is on this point that we are confronted with the hard choice in choosing a strategy for 
socio-economic development of Russia. One strategy is based on a dirigiste ideology that assumes a 
leading role for the state in guaranteeing the desired rates of economic growth, with strong backing 
of the organisational and financial prerequisites. Here, the major players are corporations that are 
either formally or indirectly under state control. The budget plays an active role in the financing of 
major economic projects (not just infrastructure projects) . Special “institutions of development” are 
created and called upon to create special conditions for sectors the state deems important. Led by 
the state, an institutional system is constructed to deal with e.g. problems of property, bankruptcy, 
activities outside the official economy, and so on. 
At a certain stage, this model could conceivably deliver high rates of economic growth, es-
pecially if there is a healthy flow of revenues into the state treasury. However, the drawback to this 
model is the state’s track record of ineffective investment (including those that are private in a for-
mal sense, but effectively belong to the state), compared with investments that actually are  private, 
i.e. the owner really has his own money on the line. State ineffectiveness in investment has two di-
mensions.  
First, ineffectiveness in setting investment priorities is most acute in the high-level of dy-
namism of the post-industrial era. Today, conditions and priorities already change so fast than even 
the most effective state bureaucracy cannot be expected to always react adequately or appropriately. 
The decisions taken by the authorities are always the outcome of a complicated system involving an 
agreement of interests. Nor are the challenges of our era the sole problem here. Officials may often 
find it impossible to reverse an agreed decision once it has been implemented.  
Second, there remains the more mundane problem of the overvaluing the potential value of 
investment projects when state (or quasi-statal) resources are involved.
25 
The alternative approach discussed bases modernisation on creation of a modern institu-
tional environment capable of stimulating stable economic growth and adapting to the current chal-
lenges. Modern institutions (appropriately adapted, of course, to the conditions of a given country) 
provide the most important basis for modernisation of countries pursuing a catch-up development 
strategy from the transition stage through to a post-industrial level. In implementing institutional 
development in stages, a modern developed society (institutions of contemporary market democ-
racy) can secure solutions to a complicated set of modernisation-related problems.  
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